We investigate how inequality a¤ects corruption and provide a new insight to the possible channels through which such e¤ect may work. We favour an explanation based on a multimarket framework where corruption in one market (or sector) arises because of imperfections exacerbated by inequality in related markets. We demonstrate that even when an individual's ability to pay bribes and bene…t from engaging in corruption are not a¤ected by wealth level, greater (wealth) inequality will lead to an increase in corruption.
Introduction
Bureaucratic corruption, commonly de…ned as misuse of public o¢ ce for private gains, is widespread in many of the developing economies typically characterised by market imperfections of varying degrees and inequalities. Our aim in this paper is to analytically explore how wealth inequality in the presence of market imperfections may engender corruption.
Although empirically some recent papers have found strong causal links from inequality to corruption (see You, 2005 and You and Khagram, 2005) it is not obvious how such causality may work. 1 Typical explanations of the direct role of inequality in corruption relies on the phenomena of 'state capture'by powerful groups, according to which, in a highly unequal society the rich will engage in corruption (or some other form of subversion of institutions) to maintain their privileged positions (Hellman et al 2000; Glaeser et al 2003; Do 2004) . As pointed out by Hellman and Kaufman (2002) and demonstrated in Slinko et al. (2005) this explanation is more about the 'inequality of in ‡uence'rather than wealth inequality per se. More importantly this explanation is predicated on the rich being more corrupt than the others, the evidence for which is at best patchy.
We eschew such explanation in favour of one where all agents derive the same bene…ts from corruption and have the same abililty to pay their bribes. This may seem to imply that the level of corruption will be independent of the existing levels of wealth. Yet we are able to demonstrate that in a multi-market framework it is possible for corruption to emerge or escalate in one market (where agents produce output and pay taxes), due to the e¤ects of wealth inequality in a related imperfect market (where agents borrow resources to produce output).
We consider a scenario where agents (henceforth referred to as households or …rms) di¤er along two dimensions: wealth and pro…tability/prodcutivity of production plans. While wealth levels do not a¤ect a particular …rm's expected bene…t from bribery, less productive …rms are (under some conditions) more likely to engage in corruption. This is not an unrealistic assumption, as Dabla-Norris et.al. (2008) in their recent study of determinants of informality …nd that informality is associated with less productive …rms. In fact in our model context, there are situations where ithese …rms are able to survive in a market because they happen to be corrupt.
Wealth levels matter because …rms have to borrow capital in an imprefect credit market. We show how informational problems coupled with the wealth constraints in the credit market contribute to the existence of the less productive …rms. Hence, in some sense, corruption rises in the product market because of inequality and informational problems in the credit market. More speci…cally, we analyse how the credit market is unable to screen out less productive …rms when some households are wealth constrained. These …rms tend to get subsidized in the credit market and bene…t from corruption -thus making their operation viable and possibly pro…table. Since the less productive …rms are more likely to engage in corruption, their presence in the product market determines the extent of corruption. Further, as wealth inequality rises it leads to an increase in the level corruption by e¤ecting the entry of less productive …rms and exit of wealth constrained productive …rms.
Our paper is related to earlier work by Banerjee (1997) which also explores the e¤ects of wealth inequality on level of equilibrium red tape. Our treatment of wealth inequality is very similar but concerns and notions of corruption are di¤erent. Our paper is also related to the recent paper by Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) which looks at the redistributive e¤ects of corruption in the presence of credit market imperfections and wealth constraints. Credit market su¤ers from imperfect enforcement of credit contract and hence lenders ration the amount of credit to prevent voluntary default. The amount of credit available to a particular agent will depend on the agent's wealth level. Thus, agents with low level of wealth may not be able to generate enough funds to become entrepreneurs. Such market imperfections will prevent agents from becoming entreprenuers even in the absence of any kind of corruption. We, on the other hand, consider an alternative model of credit markets characterized by informational asymmetries and imperfect screening. Additionally, they consider non-collusive corruption and we focus on collusive corruption.
2 In collusive corruption both the bribe payer and payee 2 As is well known, corruption takes various forms. Papers such as Shleifer and Vishny (1993) , Bliss and di Tella (1997) and the recent …rm level studies (Svensson 2003) , focus on corruption as extortion, where agents pay bribes because of extortionary demand by the public o¢ cials and are not the real bene…ciaries. In agency based models of corruption such as Besley and McLaren (1993) , Mookherjee and Png (1995) both the briber and bribee bene…t. There are also studies where both the features are present (Marjit et.al stand to bene…t from the corrupt act. Although corruption manifests itself in many ways, here we only consider the problem of …rms engaging in various acts of bribery to avoid legal costs of doing their business. In this sense our notion of a corrupt …rm is very similar to the notion of informality used by Dabla-Norris et. al. (2008) who look at the determinants of informality in a completely di¤erent context.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the characteristics of di¤erent agents and how they interact strategically in our model. Section 3 contains the results and analysis under di¤erent scenarios. We explore the link between corruption in the product market and imperfections in the credit market. We argue that they reinforce each other and it may not be su¢ cient to just study one market alone in this context. We discuss its implications for the relation between corruption and inequality. Lastly, section 4 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications and the limitations of our model.
The Model
We have three di¤erent agents who act in a strategic fashion: (a) households, (b) inspectors and (c) banks . We describe the characteristics of each agent below.
The Households
Households can either join the production sector (…rms) or engage in some outside option.
3 They di¤er in terms of the payo¤ from their outside option. When it comes to production, there are two types of households, (i) households with good projects (g) and (ii) households with bad projects (b). The good projects have a higher probability of success, that is, g > b . Each project yields Y in the successful state and zero in the failure state.
Households also di¤er in terms of their initial wealth which is private information. Wealth inequality is captured through the existence of some wealth constrained households. These wealth constrained households can have good or bad projects, but to simplify the analysis we assume that these wealth constrained households have only good projects and denote this group as p.
5 So e¤ectively we have three groups, the rich households with good projects (g), the poor households with good projects (p) and the rich households with the bad projects (b). The total number of di¤erent types of households is given.
All households must borrow a certain amount say, K, from a bank. Households staying out of the production sector do not need to borrow, and receive some …xed outside income. Households also incur several non-input costs of running a legal business but can engage in bribery to avoid such costs. Inspectors are supposed to ensure compliance by the …rms, but they can collude with the …rm and avoid reporting. Similar to the literature on 'state capture', we view corruption as collusion between o¢ cials and agents, where both parties bene…t. This collusive feature of corruption is key to the present paper.
Inspectors
Inspectors are in charge of monitoring compliance by the …rms. A …rm faces a …ne, F , if its non-compliance is reported. However, inspectors are corruptible and can collude with the …rm in exchange for a bribe. We assume the corruptible inspectors constitute a certain fraction q of the total population of inspectors. Hence, q stands for the scope of corruption or corruptibility of the system.
The Banks
The banks borrow funds from the public at a …xed interest factor r 0 , and extend loans of …xed amount K to the …rms. Project returns are stochastic.
Let i be the probability of success in a project undertaken by type-i household. Let r i be the interest factor paid and w i be the amount of collateral pledged. Various types of assets, which constitute household's wealth, can serve as collateral. We assume that the bank incurs a cost, , associated with having a collateral. If the bank can observe the types of borrowers then for each type the bank chooses fr i ; w i g such that the bank maximizes
where < 1 shows the cost the banks face in keeping a collateral and 0 = K:r 0 . In case the bank cannot observe the di¤erent types of borrowers, but instead knows the distribution i (probability of a borrower being type i), the bank maximizes
We assume there is perfect competition in the banking sector, so that the above condition is always satis…ed with equality. We shall call it the zero-pro…t condition.
Production
In addition to the standard input costs, households (…rms) engaged in production have to incur various costs in running a legitimate business. Some of these would depend on their output or pro…t and some are …xed in nature. In many developing economies, these would take the form of costs of compliance with various regulatory standards, quality control, safety and labour laws. We assume that …rms can avoid these costs. For example, …rms can choose to disregard pollution control, use substandard inputs, substitute adult labour with child labour. In addition to all these, …rms can of course hide output and sales to save on various sales taxes and pro…t tax. In economies with high levels of compliance, …rms do not have so much of a choice and hence no strategic importance can be attached. However, these play an important role in our model. All these non-production costs of legitimate business will be denoted by T and we assume that all households have wealth to meet these costs.
7 While some components are likely to be incurred after output is realized, we assume that …rms have to invest T before output is realised. In some ways this discourages households from entering the market, specially those with bad projects (as the b-types). However, in presence of corruption, the households can bribe the inspector and end up paying a smaller amount. It is clear that household's expected income from production will depend on the cost of evading T and the cost of borrowing K. Depending on whether the household incurs the legitimate cost T or not, the j th -household of type-i will undertake production if and only if
or
where V ij represent the expected income of the j th -household within type-i; X i is the expected cost of evading T , which includes bribes and …nes, and V 0 ij is the outside option available to the j th -household of type-i. Note when households undertakes production activities V ij = V i , 8j 2 i. Also note that legitimate cost T is paid ex-ante but the cost of evasion is borne ex-post. This is an important distinction since the cost of evasion is borne ex-post, wealth constraints would not be a deterrent for corruption.
We assume that V 0 ij 2 [V ; V ] and all types have the same uniform distribution over [V ; V ]. So V i will determine what fraction of the household of type-i will undertake production.
Equilibrium
After production has been undertaken, depending on the realization of Y , the …rm makes a report of its income. The failure state can be viewed as a bankruptcy state and can always be veri…ed. If the …rm declares bankruptcy, the bank will verify the state and claim the value of collaterals w i . As is standard in the literature, we assume that a …rm will never declare bankruptcy with positive output. In the successful state, the …rm makes the due repayment r i :K to the bank.
Before we begin the analysis it will be useful to summarize the sequence of moves in the model.
1. Nature chooses the di¤erent types of the household. The households decide whether to undertake prodcution or not. This decision is denoted by a 2 f0; 1g, where a = 1 refers to production activity. 2. The bank o¤ers a contract or a menu of contracts to the households (or …rms) (r i ; w i ).
3. The …rms choose particular contracts. 4. Firms choose l 2 f0; 1g, where l = 1 refers to …rm's decision to incur the cost T (and not engage in corruption). Once the output is realized, …rm repays the bank according to the agreed contract.
5. Inspection is carried out by the inspectors. Corrupt inspectors can collude with the …rm.
6. Following the inspector's report, all bribes or …nes are paid. For convenience, we shall label stages 2-3 as the credit market game and stages 4-6 as the bribe game. Since these are inter-linked, the outcome in the bribe game will determine the outcome in the credit market. We shall be looking at equilibria satisfying backward induction.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is de…ned as a tuple fa ij ; l i ; (r i ; w i )g such that given households'decision, the credit market is in equilibrium and given the credit contracts (r i ; w i ) each household's decision is optimal.
An equilibrium in the game stages 2-7 will induce a unique outcome on household's entry decisions. We shall …nd it convenient to describe household's choice to enter, by the participation rate of each type of householddenoted by i . It represents the fraction of households of type-i entering production sector. Then given i , we can calculate the distribution of different types in the credit market as i = (N i i )= P N i i where N i refers to the number of type i households in the population, i = g; b; p. Notice that both the total number of …rms entering production and the number of …rms choosing evasion and bribery will be determined in equilibrium.
Results and Analysis

Bribe Game
For the purpose of tracking how wealth inequality transmits from the credit market through to corruption in the product market, we shall intentionally keep our bribe game simple. We assume that all …rms are inspected. If a …rm decides not to incur the cost T , it can then be apprehended by an inspector and be subject a …ne F . We shall assume that a non-compliant …rm if caught has to forgo net output. Hence
This could be interpreted as a situation where a …rm ceases to operate once its illegal behavior is detected. In that case only …rms with lower expected pro…tability are likely to take the risk of being illegal.
However, recall that q proportion of the inspectors are corrupt. A corrupt inspector can always collude with the …rm and not report the non-compliance in exchange for a bribe. The bribe amount obviously will depend on the relative bargaining powers between the inspector and the …rms. Without going in to the actual bribe determination process, we take bribe to be proportional to the …ne.
8 We also assume limited liability which implies that …nes can not be collected from non-successful …rms. Hence, using (3) and (4), a …rm will choose l = 0 if and only if
Or,
Remark 1 There is a critical success rate , such that all …rms with i will evade T and engage in corruption.
Note that is type speci…c because it depends on Z i , which in turn will depend on the credit market outcome.
9 From (6) it is clear that for a given i , a high r i and consequently a lower Z i , will increase the possibility that a type will be corrupt.
Since T is …xed and …rms have limited liabilities, all …rms have the same amount of bene…t from evasion and are able to pay the required amount of bribes. This avoids any direct role of inequality in corruption as has been our intention in this paper. But, because …nes or bribes are paid ex-post, the …rm with a lower successful probability faces a lower expected cost (…nes and bribes) and hence is more likely to be corrupt. 10 8 This can be interpreted as the outcome of a game where the inspector makes a take-itor-leave-it proposal with probability and the …rm can accept or reject. The …rm makes a similar o¤er with probability (1 ). 9 Our working paper considers various formulations. If F is …xed then the critical success rate is independent of Z i : On the other hand the present formulation can be generalised to consider a lump sum tax T and a proportional tax on pro…ts (tZ i ).
10 In much of the analysis we use the number of …rms that chooses l = 0 as a measure of
Credit Market
Before we discuss the credit market outcome, it is useful to consider the benchmark case where there is complete information about the type of projects.
Recall that banks have no information about the wealth of the households, hence they can not distinguish between the rich good type (g-type) and poor good type (p-type). We shall assume that the level of wealth does not a¤ect a household's need to borrow K or income streams Y . 
Complete Information Benchmark
Given positive collateral cost, 1 > > 0; it is easy to see that under complete information there is no need for collateral.
[Insert Figure 1 ] then none of …rms will be corrupt. Although such extreme cases may be plausible, our focus is on the in between scenario where only the b-types engage in corruption, which will be the case if the following condition holds. We shall assume that
corruption. In earlier versions of the paper we have considered other indicators like size of bribes. 11 A natural interpretation of this wealth would be various assets which can not be subsititued directly for capital in the production process but households could borrow money against these.
We shall also assume that some g-types always enter. Participation rates are given by Figure 1 that contracts D and E will be o¤ered in equilibrium. Firms with a good projects will be o¤ered contract E (lower interest rate) and …rms with a bad projects will be o¤ered D (higher interest rate). Bank's zero-proft condition is satis…ed. Since D does not require any collateral, wealth constraints do not matter and (7) guranatees that b-types will evade T and engage in bribery whenever apprehended by an honest inspector. However, this does not guarantee that corruption will take place in equilibrium. That depends on whether the b-types will enter production in the …rst place, that is, whether
Proof. (Sketch only) It is clear from
Moreover, it can be veri…ed that V 
Incomplete Information
Next, we study the case where the bank can not identify the di¤erent types. A bank can use the two instruments, r and w, at its disposal to screen the di¤erent types. Due to the presence of p-type …rms the standard screening outcome of the credit market, where all three di¤erent types are completely separated, is not feasible.
12 This is because in any separating outcome, the g-type will have to put up some collateral, but since the p-types are collateral constrained, the bank is forced to o¤er them a contract with no collateral.
12 See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for various screening models in the credit market.
We have assumed the credit market to be competitive, even though we do not model the competition between banks in an explicit manner. The bank's zero pro…t condition is satis…ed in equilibrium and there is no contract that the bank can deviate to and make positive pro…t. Using superscript s to denote the outcome under incomplete information, V s i represent the expected income of type-i and
Recall that the probability that a borrower belongs to type-i household undertaking production is given by i where
Consider the outcome where all three types are pooled. Let r be the interest rate where all three types are pooled and the bank's zero pro…t condition is met. It is given by the following
Point G in Figure 1 refers to this interest rate. Likewise, consider an outcome where the b and p-types pool but the g-types are seprated. In such a semiseparating equilibrium the pooled interest rate (partial pooling of) is given by
where i represents the proportion of type-i engaged in production and accepting the pooled contract under the semi-separating equilibrium;
Comparing (11) and (12), it is easy to see that r > r. Before we state the next Proposition, it would bee useful to consider the following two de…nitions.
Let 0 be the success probability of the b-type such that the b-type with lowest outside option is indi¤erent between entering production and not when o¤ered the complete information interest rate.
Likewise, let 1 is the success probability of the b-type which makes the g type is indi¤erent between the grand pooling outcome (11) and the semiseparating outcome (12). For b > 0 ; b-types will …nd it pro…table to enter. Now, a semi-separating equilibrium is possible, where the g-types are separated out and the b and p-types pool. Contract pair (r g ; w g ) and (r ; 0) (represented by B and A respectively), is o¤ered. The g-types chooses contract B and the p and btypes pool at A. Note that the b-types have no incentive to deviate from A to B: The p-types cannot deviate to any contract with w > 0. Moreover, the g-types also have no incentive to deviate to A: It is easy to show that (r g ; w g ) is given by the incentive compatible condition for b-type,
and the zero pro…t condition of the bank,
The semi-separating contract pair, (r g ; w g ) and (r ; 0), will indeed be an equilibrium if a bank can not deviate and o¤er a pooled contract fetching non-negative pro…t. 13 Such deviations can be ruled out if the pooled interest rate G lies above the point H, since in that case the g-types will not prefer the pooled contract. Comparing with the complete information case, the b-types are better o¤ and their participation increases. For the g types V approaches g ) the pooled interest rate given by point G moves closer to E: Let 1 be the value of b such that G = H: Clearly, for b > 1 ;the semi-seprating outcome ceases to be an equilibrium. The pooled outcome given by r (11) and denoted by G is the only equilibrium. This is where the b-types are subsidized the most and As before, this case can be ruled out since (7) holds. We know that since Z c g , the g-types income under the complete information scenario, is the highest possible income that …rms in this economy can achieve, therefore Z s b < Z c g . Hence, using (6), it must be the case that
Therefore the b-types will continue to choose l = 0.
Since more b-types enter the market the number of …rms in equilibrium opting for the illegal route, and as a consequence bribery, will rise. This would imply that the level of corruption as measured by the ratio of corrupt …rms to the total number of …rms will be higher. We summarize the previous discussion in the following. Under incomplete information and wealth inequality, corruption is higher in equilibrium as a larger fraction of the total …rms will engage in bribery.
Example Consider an economy with N b = 6000; N p = 1200; N g = 517. Let K = 20; 0 = 20; = 1=2; b = 1=4; g = 1=2; Y = 200; T = 20: For the bribe game, let q = 1=2; = 1=7 . For simplicity consider penalty to be …xed F = 77: Using (6) it is clear that b = g = p = 0:45, hence only b-types will …nd it pro…table to evade T . The expected payments (bribe with probability q and …ne F with probability (1 q)) is 41:25. Recall that these payments are made only in the successful state. The support of the outside options is given by V = 20; V = 60: For the complete information case, using (1), and (9) it is easy to check that r (14), it can be checked that this constitutes an equilibrium. Given the participation rates we can solve for the following distribution of types p = b = 2=5 and g = 1=5 (since i = ( i N i )= P i N i ). The zero pro…t condition (2), and (14) for the banks is satis…ed. If a bank were to deviate and o¤er a completely pooled contract (while still earning zero pro…t), the corresponding interest rate ( 11) will be 5=2: However, at this interest rate, the g-types earn an expected payo¤ of 55 which is lower than their equilibrium payo¤ of 58:66. Hence such a deviation will not be successful. In this equilibrium, 40 percent of the …rms will be engaging in evasion and bribery. Therefore, compared to the complete information case, there is an increase in corrupt activities.
Changes in Inequality
Changes in inequality matters in our model to the extent it a¤ects the proportion of wealth constrained households N p relative to other households N b ,
14 Since total number of households and total wealth remain same, all changes in inequality can be seen as resulting from mean preserving spreads.
15
Consider a redistribution such that N b stays the same, N g falls and N p rises with N g + N p remaining same. 16 This change in type distribution of households (g type and p type) will a¤ect the equilibrium outcome and participation rates of di¤erent types of households. Given that households di¤er in terms of bribing behaviour, level of corruption will also be a¤ected.
The e¤ect of redistribution will also depend on the nature of credit market equilibrium. If g-types and p-types are being treated in identical fasion (Cases (i) and (iii) in Proposition 2) then the redistribution described above will have no impact. In both cases ((i) and (iii)) the equilibrium depends on the total number good households, not their distribution in terms of constrained (p-type) or unconstrained (g type). However, in the semi-seprating equilibrium, the p-types have a lower participation than the g type and the equilibrium con…guration depends on the distribution of households. It is clear that following a redistribution of the kind described above, the equilibrium interest rate r will fall and the separating contract for the g-type (r g ; w g ) will also change. Before we state the proposition, let us consider the numerical example.
Example (contd.) Consider the previous example and the semi-separating equilibrium. Now consider a redistribution of wealth so that the number of wealth constrained households goes up. Let N b = 6000; N p = 1717; N g = 0.
Since only wealth constrained p-types and unconstrained b-types are present, the new equilibrium will be a simple pooling equilibrium with r = 5=2: The participation rates will be higher for both types; Comparing the number of …rms before and after the redistribution, the number of b-types engaged in production goes up from 1000 to 1125 and the number p-types and g-types engaged in production falls from 1500 to 1488. Since, by assumption, the b-types engage in corruption the level of corruption goes up following the redistribution. The following Proposition formalizes this idea.
Proposition 3 Consider the semi-seprating equilibrium described in Proposition 2. As the fraction of poor households increases following a rise in wealth inequality, more b-type …rms enter the production sector and some g-type …rms leave. This leads to a rise in the proportion of corrupt …rms in the market.
Proof. First, given the pre-redistribution participation rates, rise in N p will lead to a rise in p and fall in b . Since g > b , it is clear that (using (12)) r will fall. Consequently, fr g ; w g g will also change. Following a fall in r payo¤s to all the three types (V 
So there will be an increase in the participation rates for each type (whenever feasible). The e¤ect on the market outcome depends on the pre-distribution participation rates. Suppose, prior to redistribution, In such case, there will be no change in the participation rates of households with good projects and only the number of bad projects increases in equilibrium.
On the other hand, consider a case where prior to redistribution 1
Let e denote the participation rates in the new equilibrium and e N be the post-distribution numbers of di¤erent households in the economy. Let N g e N g = e N p N p = n. The change in the total number of good projects ( n g + n p ) entering production will be given by
where the …rst term (in the right hand side) shows the increase in the number of g-types who remained rich; the second term indicates the increase in the number of p-types and the last term accounts for the g-types who had exited once they became poor. It can be shown that n g + n p < 0.
17
Hence there will be more b-types. Given (7) and the arguments preceding Corrollary 1, there will be more bribe paying and fewer abiding households in the production sector.
Remark 2 Note that b-type households and bribe paying households or extent 17 The details are in our working paper version, available upon request.
of corruption are identical in much of the analysis. As Z b (or more precisely V b ) increases following a fall in the pooled rate, b also falls and b < g < b may not hold any more. Following a rise in Z b ; the b-types might choose to abide and corruption will reduce to zero. It can be shown that if we raise the Z or V of all types, corruption can be reduced. This might suggest that our model of the link between inequality and corruption relates experience of low income countries (with lower Z or V ) Remark 3 We have considered only the proportion of corrupt …rms as a measure of corruption. As mentioned earlier, we could use 'the total amount of bribes paid'as another measure. To the extent (7) holds and only b-type …rms are always corrupt, both the measures move in the same direction in all the previous propositions. Since the participation of b-types can only increase following a rise in Z b , and the size of bribe is given by d i = Z i ; this implies that the total amount of bribes paid also goes up.
Conclusion
Our objective was to provide a rationale for the causal link from inequality to corruption. We have done that using a multi-market framework where the presence of wealth inequality in the credit market prevents the screening of the e¢ cient …rms from the ine¢ cient …rms, thus allowing ine¢ cient …rms to enter the market, bringing corruption in its wake. We do not wish to claim that our approach provides the only explanation linking inequality to corruption. Although there may exist other possibilities, our approach, provides a plausible explanation of how corruption is a¤ected by wealth inequality even when an individual's ability and willingness to engage in corruption is not directly a¤ected by the person's wealth. Since bribe are paid ex post (after the project returns are realized) a poor household can also a¤ord to pay bribes and the bene…t from corruption to the household depends on its e¢ ciency type but not the level of wealth. We feel that this makes our analysis more interesting since there is no obvious reason why wealth inequality should matter so far as corruption is concerned.
Our model can be extended in couple of other directions. First, an obvious question is how the poor households are a¤ected by the presence of corruption. Even though poor households can bene…t and can engage in corruption to the same extent as the rich, our model shows that some of these poor households (the wealth constrained households with good projects) are adversely a¤ected because of credit market imperfections. Recall that as more households with bad projects enter -the more these poor households are adversely a¤ected. Second, one can also address the issue of the link between corruption and competition in the presence of wealth inequality and market imperfections. 18 We have left these issues for future research. The multi-market orientation of our model can lead to a somewhat different focus so far as policy implications are concerned. It shows that policy intervention crucially depends on the nature of outcomes in related markets: for instance, intervention in the credit market, will depend on the extent of corruption. Likewise, anti-corruption policies have to be evaluated in the light of the credit market outcomes. In general, anti-corruption policy analysis takes a partial equilibrium approach and focuses on the same market where corruption takes place. In the present case that would mean raising inspection probability or the …ne, and reduce the incentive for inspectors to be corrupt. Our paper, complementary to this approach, would point also in the direction of the credit market. As seen in our numerical example, elimination of imperfections in the credit market can eliminate corruption by preventing the entry of the corruption prone …rms. This, we consider, is an important point to bear in mind while designing policies especially in developing countries where more than one market exhibit various kinds of imperfections. This view in a wider context is not new, but is worth emphasizing in the context of corruption. 
